Scottish Court of Session Decisions

 

OUTER HOUSE, COURT OF SESSION

[2017] CSOH 12

 

P469/16

OPINION OF LORD MULHOLLAND

In the cause

MUHAMMAD AMJAD also known as MUHAMMAD AMIN

Pursuer

against

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT

Defender

Pursuer:  Caskie;  Drummond Miller LLP

Defender:  Maciver;  Office of the Advocate General

27 January 2017

Introduction
[1]          This is a Judicial Review of decisions dated 8 and 22 April 2016 by the Secretary of State for the Home Department to refuse leave to remain on the basis that additional information submitted to the respondent did not amount to a fresh claim for asylum and there was no realistic prospect of success in an appeal.  The petitioner also seeks to reduce the decision dated 4 May 2016 to remove the petitioner from the United Kingdom. 

 

Immigration History
[2]        The petitioner was born on 28 January 1978.  He is a Pakistani citizen.  He arrived in the United Kingdom (UK) flying direct from Lahore in January 1997.  He used his own passport endorsed with a visit visa obtained by an agent.  He told the Immigration Officer at the airport that the purpose of his visit was as a visitor.  He was granted leave to enter for six months.  He remained in the UK as an overstayer until 12 May 2013 when he claimed asylum on the same day as his arrest as a suspected illegal immigrant.  His application for asylum was refused on 31 May 2013.  His appeal was dismissed on 22 August 2013 (decision of the First-tier Tribunal of the Immigration and Asylum Chamber which is 7/1 of the inventory of productions).  On 5 September 2013 he sought permission to appeal.  This was refused on 17 September 2013.  On 8 October 2013 he sought permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal.  This was refused and his appeal rights ended on 14 October 2013.  He made further submissions on 12 February 2014.  These were refused on 8 April 2016 with no right of appeal on the basis that they did not amount to a fresh claim for asylum (letter from the respondent which is 6/3 of the inventory of productions).  After his detention for removal the petitioner made a further claim for leave to remain on the basis that he was a victim of torture prior to his departure from Pakistan.  This was refused with no right of appeal on the basis that it did not amount to a fresh claim for asylum (letter from respondent dated 22 April 2016 which is 6/7 of the inventory of productions).  An order for the removal of the petitioner was made on 4 May 2016 (6/1 of the inventory of productions).  This order has been suspended pending determination of this review.

 

Grounds of Review
[3]        The petitioner does not challenge the respondent’s rejection of the asylum claim or fresh claim in relation to asylum, nor the rejection of the Article 8 private life claim within the Immigration Rules (statement 10 of the petition).  The challenge is to the rejection of the petitioner’s Article 8 claim outside the Immigration Rules.  The petitioner challenges this decision on the basis that (1) the respondent failed to have regard to the fact that delays in the immigration appeal tribunal process would mean that, by the time the petitioner’s case was heard on appeal, he would succeed under the Immigration Rules on the basis of the 20 year residency rule, (2) the respondent failed to have regard to the previously submitted evidence about the petitioner’s private life in the UK in assessing whether the petitioner’s further representations amounted to a fresh claim, (3) the respondent, in considering whether there were significant obstacles to the petitioner’s reintegration to Pakistan, had failed to take into account factors which were a barrier to reintegration, and had failed to explain why an immigration judge could not reach a contrary finding to the one that there were no significant obstacles to the petitioner’s reintegration to Pakistan if returned, and (4) the respondent erred in failing to find that the petitioner’s Article 8 private life claim was one of substance that an immigration judge may allow on appeal.

 

The Respondent’s Decision of 8 April 2016
[4]        The petitioner’s further claim for asylum was on the basis that he feared returning to Pakistan due to threats against his life from members of the Lashkar‑e‑Jhangvi group and a lack of state protection (paragraph 11 of the decision letter).  The immigration judge’s findings are set out at paragraphs 16 – 19.  The respondent noted that the immigration judge had rejected the petitioner’s account that he had converted to the Shia branch of Islam and as a result was at risk of persecution if returned to Pakistan.  The immigration judge held that the petitioner’s account on these matters was wholly incredible and also found that the delay of 16 years before deciding to claim international protection (coincidental with his arrest as an illegal entrant) was not consistent with those of a genuine asylum seeker who would be expected to claim asylum and follow the asylum claim through at the earliest opportunity.  The additional information provided by the petitioner is summarised at paragraph 20 of the decision letter.  It is described as a reassertion that he feared returning to Pakistan due to threats against his life from members of the Lashkar‑e‑Jhangvi group and a lack of state protection.  A number of documents were submitted in support of the claim.  These were assessed against a background of forged and fraudulent documents being available in Pakistan and the onus being on the petitioner to establish that the documents could be relied on (paragraphs 22 – 32 of the decision letter).  Following an analysis of the documents the respondent concluded that no weight should be attached to the documents (paragraph 32 of the decision letter).  With regard to the lack of effective state protection in Pakistan the respondent noted that the petitioner had failed to provide any evidence of this and in any event there was nothing to refute the findings of the recent case of AW (Sufficiency of Protection) Pakistan [2011] UKUT 31 (IAC) that the relevant background evidence does not demonstrate a general insufficiency in state protection offered in Pakistan.  The letter concludes consideration of the additional information in respect of the asylum claim as follows: 

“[34] Consequently it is not accepted that you are at risk of persecution on return to Pakistan on account of your fear from members of Lashkar-e-Jhangvi group or that there is a lack of effective state protection and there is no realistic prospect of an Immigration Judge, when applying anxious scrutiny, coming to a different conclusion.”

 

The respondent then considered the petitioner’s Article 8 claim.  With regard to family life the respondent noted that Home Office records show that the petitioner has a cousin in the UK and that there are no provisions for this relationship in Appendix FM (family members) within the rules (paragraph 40 of the decision letter).  The respondent then goes on to consider the private life aspect of the claim under Rule 276ADE of the Immigration Rules.  The respondent notes that as a result of his age and length of stay in the UK he fails to meet the requirements of sub paragraphs (iii)(iv) or (v).  Sub paragraph (vi) sets out the requirement to be met by an applicant for leave to remain on the grounds of private life in the UK as

“aged over 18 years or above, has lived continuously in the UK for less than 20 years (discounting any period of imprisonment) but there would be very significant obstacles to the applicant’s integration into the country to which he would have to go to if required to leave the UK.”

 

I note that this is considered as at the date of the application.  The respondent considered whether there were very significant obstacles to the petitioner’s reintegration into Pakistan.  The respondent noted that the petitioner had lived in Pakistan for at least 19 years (paragraph 47 of the decision letter), that this included all his childhood and therefore he had been thoroughly exposed to the cultural norms of that society in a significant manner.  These would not dissolve over a period of up to 19 years in the UK.  The respondent noted that there was no evidence adduced to indicate that the time spent in the UK had led to the dissolution of these ties, including language.  It was noted that the petitioner’s family was in Pakistan and there were no known obstacles to utilising any skills to obtain employment on return (paragraphs 48-49 of the decision letter).  The respondent concluded at paragraphs 50 and 51 that:

“50. It is considered that for the above reasons there are no significant obstacles to your integration into Pakistan and you therefore fail to fulfil the requirements of Rule 276ADE(vi).

 

51. As such you do not meet the requirements under Rule 276ADE. Therefore you do not meet the requirements for leave to remain on the grounds of your private life and there is no realistic prospect of an Immigration Judge, when applying anxious scrutiny, coming to a different conclusion.”

 

The respondent then considered the petitioner’s Article 8 claim outside the Rules.  With regard to family life the respondent noted that the petitioner’s relationship with his cousin in the UK did not extend beyond normal emotional ties nor was there any dependency between them (paragraph 53 of the decision letter).  Contact could be maintained through modern means of communication.  With regard to private life it was noted that the petitioner had lived in the UK for up to 19 years and may have established some friendships during that time.  Contact with these friends could be maintained through other means of communication.  The respondent considered that he had no substantial domestic commitments in the UK (paragraph 54 of the decision letter).  The petitioner was of reasonable health and fitness and had never had any legitimate expectations of being able to remain in the UK permanently, and had therefore established what private life he had while fully aware of his precarious immigration status (paragraph 55 of the decision letter).  The consideration by the respondent concluded as follows: 

“56. You are an immigration offender who entered the UK illegally, failed to regularise your stay and failed to keep in touch with immigration control. In addition you were only encountered by chance on 12 May 2013. Substantial weight is given to the public interest in maintaining and enforcing immigration control. Public interest lies squarely in the removal of immigration offenders from the UK and there are no genuinely compelling factors in your case that would render your removal disproportionate.

 

57. Therefore, for the reasons given above it is considered that your circumstances are not such as to render your removal unjustifiably harsh, and there is no realistic prospect of successfully persuading an Immigration Judge otherwise.

 

58. Your asylum claim has been reconsidered on all the evidence available, including your further submissions dated 12 February 2014 but it has been decided that the decision of 31 May 2013 should not be reversed. The further submissions submitted are hereby rejected. Accordingly it is not appropriate to grant you leave in the UK for the reasons outlined in our earlier letters and also above. Furthermore it has been decided that your submissions do not amount to a fresh claim. The new submissions taken together with the previous considered material do not create a realistic prospect of success.”

 

Finally the respondent considered that there were no exceptional circumstances that removal from the UK was no longer appropriate (paragraphs 60 – 63 of the decision letter). 

 

The Respondent’s Decision of 22 April 2016
[5]        The respondent, in response to a Rule 35 report dated 10 April 2016 (Detention Centre Rules 2001), reconsidered the petitioner’s asylum claim in light of the evidence contained within the report.  This was refused for broadly the same reasons as set out in the decision letter of 8 April 2016.

 

Submissions for the Petitioner
[6]        Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the respondent, in reaching a decision on the petitioner’s Article 8 claim, should have had regard to the time taken for an appeal to be disposed of, on average 43 weeks, which would take the petitioner past the 20 year residency red line and result in a successful application within the Rules.  This was not a “near miss” argument but a failure to take into account the passage of time and the effect of that on providing the petitioner with a successful long residence application within the Rules.  The respondent’s policy in a further submissions application was to have regard to all relevant matters.  In failing to have regard to the effect of the passage of time she has failed in the application of her own policy and to take the petitioner’s case at its highest.  The petitioner also submitted that the respondent had failed to have regard to the previous submitted evidence about the petitioner’s private life in the UK.  The decision letter of 8 April 2016 when dealing with the Article 8 private life claim outside the Rules stated at paragraph 54 that no evidence of private life had been submitted.  This failed to recognise and take into account evidence previously submitted by the petitioner of a cousin in the UK, the statements of his friends and the testimonial letter from an Islamic centre in Glasgow (included in 7/2 of the inventory of productions).  The petitioner also submitted that the respondent had not considered all factors when determining whether there were significant obstacles to the petitioner’s reintegration to Pakistan.  The respondent had only looked at factors which would assist the petitioner’s reintegration but had left out of account those which were a barrier to reintegration, including that he had lived in the UK for almost 20 years, had never lawfully worked in the UK and had no social status and longstanding friends in Pakistan to provide assistance.  As these factors had been left out of account the respondent had failed to exercise anxious scrutiny and had failed to explain why an immigration judge could not reach a contrary view to the one that there were no significant obstacles to the petitioner’s reintegration to Pakistan.  Finally, the petitioner submitted that the respondent erred in holding that there was no realistic prospect of an immigration judge allowing an Article 8 private life appeal outside the Rules standing the length of residence in the UK and his private life within the UK.  An immigration judge could give these factors more weight when assessing proportionality.  

 

Submissions for the Respondent
[7]        The respondent must consider an application on the facts at the time the application was made.  No other system would be fair or make organisational sense.  The petitioner’s argument is that claims such as his ought to be able to succeed by virtue of decision makers delaying decisions in order to improve his claim.  This is an extraordinary proposition.  To do so would circumvent the proper application of the Rules and would be arbitrary and unfair.  The petitioner’s argument is essentially a “near miss” argument which has been rejected in case law.  The petitioner’s argument ignores the fact that in order to satisfy the 20 year residence criteria there are conditions, in addition to residence, to be met and it cannot be known whether these conditions will be met until an application has been submitted.  No application has been submitted on the basis of the 20 year residence criteria.  With regard to the issue whether the respondent had regard to previously submitted evidence when considering the Article 8 private life claim, the respondent has had regard to this evidence.  This evidence is contained within the bundle of witness statements, which is 7/2 of the inventory of productions, and the petitioner’s statement.  It is clear that the respondent had regard to this evidence.  The evidence was considered for the 2013 appeal (paragraph 55 of the judgment), which appeal is referred to at paragraph 16 of the decision letter of 8 April 2016.  There the decision letter quotes extracts from the judgment of the First-tier Tribunal judge in 2013.  Further the decision letter considered the evidence of the petitioner’s cousin resident in the UK at paragraph 53 and his friendships at paragraph 54.  It is clear therefore that the respondent did have regard to the previously submitted evidence in reaching a decision.  With regard to the respondent’s consideration of significant obstacles, there were ample reasons given in the decision letter as to why the respondent did not accept that there were sufficient obstacles to the petitioner’s reintegration to Pakistan.  These are set out at paragraphs 41 – 50 of the decision letter of 8 April 2016.  The approach to consideration of this issue is set out at paragraph 46 of the decision letter of 8 April 2016 which is within the margin of appreciation given to states in this area.  The factors which are said to be a barrier to re-integration were considered by the respondent at paragraphs 47 – 49 of the decision letter.  The respondent gave adequate reasons for the decision that there were no significant obstacles to the petitioner’s reintegration to Pakistan.  With regard to whether or not the respondent was right in concluding there was no realistic prospect of an immigration judge allowing an Article 8 private life appeal outside the Rules, the respondent properly took account of all relevant factors including the length of residence, family and private life in the UK, the petitioner’s health and wellbeing, his immigration history and his precarious immigration status in reaching the decision that there would be no breach of Article 8 in the petitioner’s return to Pakistan and that there was no realistic prospect of an immigration judge holding otherwise. 

 

Decision
[8]        Rule 276ADE (1) sets out the requirements to be met by an applicant for leave to remain on the grounds of private life in the UK.  The requirements are those at the date of application.  They are that the applicant: 

“(i) does not fall for refusal under any of the grounds in Section S-LTR 1.2 to S-LTR 2.3. and S-LTR.3.1. to S-LTR.4.5. in Appendix FM;  and

 

(ii) has made a valid application for leave to remain on the grounds of private life in the UK;  and

 

(iii) has lived continuously in the UK for at least 20 years (discounting any period of imprisonment);  or

 

(iv) is under the age of 18 years and has lived continuously in the UK for at least 7 years (discounting any period of imprisonment) and it would not be reasonable to expect the applicant to leave the UK;  or

 

(v) is aged 18 years or above and under 25 years and has spent at least half of his life living continuously in the UK (discounting any period of imprisonment);  or

 

(vi) subject to sub-paragraph (2), is aged 18 years or above, has lived continuously in the UK for less than 20 years (discounting any period of imprisonment) but there would be very significant obstacles to the applicant’s integration into the country to which he would have to go if required to leave the UK.”

 

The Rule therefore specifically states that the requirements apply at the date of application and not at some time in the future.  This is consistent with a non-arbitrary system of rules which is predictable, consistent and fair as between one applicant and another, see Huang v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] 2 AC 167 per Lord Bingham of Cornhill at paragraph 16.  It is also clear from the terms of the rule that 20 years residence would not in itself be sufficient.  There are other criteria to be met, namely that an application has been made, it is valid, the applicant does not fall foul of the suitability requirements and the applicant has lived continuously in the UK for 20 years, discounting any period of imprisonment.  It may be that the petitioner will in the future meet this criteria but at the date of the application he has not and the decision maker cannot speculate about what may happen in the future.  Such an approach would be arbitrary and inconsistent with the principles of a good system of rules which are predictable, consistent and fair as between one applicant and another.  The petitioner’s counsel submitted that this was not a “near miss” argument which concept has been rejected in the Supreme Court case of Patel v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2014] AC 651 per Lord Carnwath at paragraph 56 of his judgment.  I do not agree with this submission.  It seems to me that seeking to found on the length of an appeal process, which if it is of average length (it was not disputed by the respondent’s counsel that an appeal currently takes on average 43 weeks), would take the petitioner beyond 20 years residence is a “near miss argument”.  It seeks to found on the fact that the petitioner is near but not quite there and would be there if an appeal of average length was available.  He may be there, at least in terms of continuous residence, in the future but at the time of the application he was not there and that is the fact which is determinative on the application of the Rules.  It is, of course, the case that length of residence is a relevant factor when considering an Article 8 application outside the Rules, see Maslov v Austria [2009] INLR 47 at paragraph 57.  This is a factor which the respondent had regard to when considering the Article 8 claim (paragraph 54 of the decision letter of 8 April 2016).  However in my opinion, for the reasons set out above, the respondent did not err in not having regard to this factor. 

[9]        With regard to whether or not the respondent had failed to have regard to the previous submitted evidence on the petitioner’s family and private life in the UK, this evidence is contained within the bundle of witness statements, letters and the petitioner’s statement and interview, which are 7/2 of the inventory of productions.  7/2 contains a letter from the president of an Islamic centre in Glasgow and letters/statements from seven friends/acquaintances which all vouch for the petitioner’s good character and honesty.  Two of the statements from his friends also provide details about the petitioner’s alleged conversion to the Shia branch of Islam and the threat from the Lashkar‑e‑Jhangvi group.  The bundle also contains a statement from the petitioner.  7/3 of the inventory of productions is a Home Office record of interview with the petitioner on 12 May 2013.  This material and other material from the petitioner, including his oral testimony, was considered at his appeal by the immigration judge in 2013 (paragraphs 17 – 28 and 55 of the judgment).  The decision letter of 8 April 2016 refers to the appeal at paragraph 16.  There the decision letter quotes from the judgment (paragraphs 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 42, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53 and 54).  It is therefore clear to me that the respondent had regard to the judgment in reaching her decision.  The decision letter of 8 April 2013 at paragraph 54 states that with regard to the petitioner’s private life no evidence has been submitted.  However, it was acknowledged that he had lived in the UK for up to 19 years and may have established some friendships.  This is entirely consistent with the immigration judge’s description of the material in 7/2 of the inventory of productions as very brief, adding little to the petitioner’s claim (paragraph 55 of the judgment).  The judge and the respondent also rejected that petitioner’s account that he had converted to the Shia branch of Islam and as a result was at risk of persecution from the Lashkar‑e‑Jhangvi group if returned to Pakistan (paragraphs 20 – 34 of the decision letter and paragraph 50 of the judgment).  Further the decision letter considered the evidence of the petitioner’s cousin in the UK at paragraph 53.  For these reasons, I am of the view that the respondent had regard to the previously submitted evidence when reaching her decision and that all elements of the claim have been considered. 

[10]      With regard to whether the respondent had not considered all factors when determining whether there were significant obstacles to the petitioner’s reintegration to Pakistan, the burden of proof rests on the petitioner.  This is acknowledged at paragraph 46 of the decision letter of 8 April 2016.  The same paragraph also sets out the threshold applied by the respondent which is

“…something which would prevent or seriously inhibit the applicant from integrating into the country of return.  More than mere obstacles will be required.  These have to be ‘very significant’ obstacles, which is a high threshold.  Very significant obstacles will exist where the applicant demonstrates that he/she would be unable to establish a private life in the country of return, or where establishing a private life in the country of return would entail serious hardship for the applicant.”  

 

The petitioner criticised this threshold as being made up and an arbitrary interpretation of the respondent’s own policy rule.  With regard to caselaw bearing on the issue the respondent’s counsel cited the case of MS [India] v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2013] CSIH 52 which dealt with Article 8 claims within and outwith the Rules.  At paragraph 26 of the opinion of the court delivered by Lord Drummond Young is a passage which is helpful in understanding the threshold test.  There the court noted that if officials or a tribunal are asked to consider Article 8 family and private life outside the Rules, an applicant must put forward a reason for doing so.  Such a reason will usually consist of circumstances “in which refusal would result in unjustifiably harsh consequences for the individual such that refusal of the application would not be proportionate.”  Counsel submitted that “serious hardship” in paragraph 46 echoes “unjustifiably harsh” in paragraph 26 in MS [India] and to that extent is not arbitrary.  Counsel for the petitioner cited the case of Secretary of State for the Home Department v Kamara [2016] 4 WLR 152 as authority on how a court should look at the issue of “very significant obstacles”.  This case was an appeal by the Secretary of State for the Home Department against a decision of the Upper Tribunal.  The case dealt with the proposed deportation of a foreign criminal.  The relevant legislation under consideration was section 117C of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 which applied to the case.  This section required the deportation unless inter alia there would be “very significant obstacles” to the potential deportee’s integration into the country to which it is proposed that he be deported.  In considering this question the court noted without criticism the analysis of the Upper Tribunal that, by reason of the inclusion of the word “very”, the threshold was a high one.  The Upper Tribunal had considered whether the potential deportee had family, familial links, friends, social or cultural ties, and language in the country of deportation when determining whether there were “very significant obstacles” to the potential deportee’s integration.  Lord Justice Sales in refusing the appeal against the decision of the Upper Tribunal stated at paragraph 14: 

“In my view, the concept of a foreign criminal’s “integration” into the country to which it is proposed that he be deported, as set out in section 117C(4)(c) and paragraph 399A, is a broad one. It is not confined to the mere ability to find a job or to sustain life while living in the other country. It is not appropriate to treat the statutory language as subject to some gloss and it will usually be sufficient for a court or tribunal simply to direct itself in the terms that Parliament has chosen to use. The idea of “integration” calls for a broad evaluative judgment to be made as to whether the individual will be enough of an insider in terms of understanding how life in the society in that other country is carried on and a capacity to participate in it, so as to have a reasonable opportunity to be accepted there, to be able to operate on a day-to-day basis in that society and to build up within a reasonable time a variety of human relationships to give substance to the individual’s private or family life.”

 

I agree with counsel for the respondent.  The definition in paragraph 26 does not appear to me to have been plucked out of thin air.  It is a definition which is consistent with the approaches in MS [India] and Kamara focusing on whether or not a private life could be established in the country of return without serious hardship.  In my view the threshold test at paragraph 46 of the decision letter of 8 April 2016 sets out a test which is rational, reasonable and fair, and is consistent with the court’s approach to the subject.  

[11]      With regard to the application of the test at paragraph 47 of the decision letter of 8 April 2016, the respondent had regard to the petitioner’s length of time in Pakistan (19 years) where he spent all of his childhood being exposed to the cultural norms of that society, that those norms would not dissolve as a result of the time spent in the UK (19 years) and there was no evidence that the time spent in the UK had led to the dissolution of these ties.  At paragraph 48 the respondent notes that the petitioner’s family is in Pakistan and as a result he will have support networks to turn to for help and assistance.  At paragraph 49 the respondent notes that the petitioner is reasonably young and of reasonable health and fitness.  He has been working in the UK and there are no known obstacles to him utilising any skills he has developed previously to obtain employment upon his return to Pakistan.  The respondent concludes at paragraphs 50 and 51 that there are no significant obstacles to the petitioner’s integration into Pakistan and there is no realistic prospect of an immigration judge, when applying anxious scrutiny, coming to a different conclusion.  The petitioner complains that the respondent has not considered all factors in reaching a decision.  The factors which have been considered are those which assist reintegration in Pakistan, but she has left out of account those which were a barrier to reintegration such as the length of time spent in the UK, his lack of social status and friends in Pakistan, and that he has never lawfully worked whilst in the UK.  I disagree.  The respondent has clearly taken into account the length of time spent in the UK, paragraph 46 expressly refers to it, and his skillset derived from his employment in the UK.  The reference to his family being in Pakistan providing support networks is referred to at paragraph 48, and the length of time spent in Pakistan establishing cultural norms and ties is referred to also at paragraph 47.  I cannot agree that there are factors which have been left out of account.  The respondent has carefully assessed this issue and concluded, rightly in my view, that there are no significant obstacles to the petitioner’s return to Pakistan.  The reasoning is adequately set out in the decision letter and is rational, reasonable and fair.  Even if I am wrong and these factors have been left out of account I cannot foresee an immigration judge taking the view that they are sufficiently material, such that they would amount to “very significant obstacles to integration” standing the weight of the factors taken into account by the respondent in reaching her decision.  

[12]      With regard to whether the respondent erred in holding that there was no realistic prospect of an immigration judge allowing an Article 8 private life appeal outside the Rules standing the length of residence in the UK and his private life within the UK, it is the case that the petitioner’s Article 8 claim is a poor one. It is based on the length of residence in the UK, a cousin based in Leeds who he does not see and a number of friendships. His health is good and he has worked whilst in the UK (albeit unregulated). Set against this low base is the fact that he entered the country on a falsehood, he remained in the UK beyond the expiry of his visitor’s visa and his immigration status is precarious. It is such a low base for an Article 8 claim that I cannot foresee any immigration judge granting an appeal. The respondent was therefore correct in her assessment that there was no realistic prospect of an immigration judge allowing an Article 8 private life appeal.

[13]      For the foregoing reasons I refuse the petition and repel the petitioner’s second plea‑in‑law and sustain the respondent’s third and fourth pleas‑in‑law.